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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

In the matter of:

RADICAL BUNNY, L.L.C., an Arizona
limited liability company,

HORIZON PARTNERS, L.L.C., an
Arizona limited liability company,

TOM HIRSCH (aka TOMAS N.
HIRSCH) and DIANE ROSE HIRSCH,
husband and wife;

BERTA FRIEDMAN. WALDER (aka
BUNNY WALDER, a married person,

HOWARD EVAN WALDER, a
married person,

HARISH PANNALAL SHAH and
MADHAVI H. SHAH, husband and
wife,

Respondents.

DOCKET NO. S-20660A-09-0107

**RESPONDENT'S POST HEARING
MEMORANDUM**

Arizona Corporation Commission

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I. An Overview

As shown by the accompanying materials, Defendants did issue the notes in question. Defendants were members of a company that served as a buyer's agent to buy fractional interests in notes. Some were notes issued by various entities involved in construction projects (borrowers) and some were issued by Mortgages Ltd. to obtain funds to lend for construction projects. For the purpose of this Motion, those differences are irrelevant. All of the money raised was for construction, not financing for a business. The notes were commercial notes for a short-term, fixed percentage amount, were guaranteed and were not premised on someone else's profit. The participations did not result from an organized marketing or solicitation program. The crucial questions is, are such fractionalized commercial notes securities so that the Division may bring this proceeding and if so, did Defendants commit securities fraud in connection with their transfer?

The Securities Division has failed to prove fraud and it has failed to prove that what the participants received was a security.

A. The Participations Were Not "Securities."

The first program was the Horizon program which divided up loans made to third parties by Mortgages Ltd. Radical Bunny later made loans to Mortgages Ltd. as a whole, took all of the assets Mortgages Ltd. had as security for those loans and then divided those loans. *See* Exhibits S-33, S-37A, S-37B. The note in question was always issued by Mortgages Ltd. The participants signed a direction to purchase which referred to a specific RBMLTD loan. *See* Exhibits S-12E, S-12G, S-13F, S-13H. That notice was accompanied by a letter, *see* Exhibit S-12 i, Shah at p. 1122, l. 10-20, which informed the parties that Horizon Partners investments would be serviced by Radical Bunny and would be subject to servicing expense of 2%. Participants also received a higher rate of return. Nobody denied they were told that Radical Bunny would not receive a spread under the new program, but more to the point, nobody said they thought that

1 Radical Bunny was in charge of Mortgages Ltd.'s ability to pay. No participant
2 thought Radical Bunny controlled Mortgages Ltd.'s investments. Radical Bunny
3 made loans to Mortgages Ltd. and before September of 2005 received existing
4 Mortgages Ltd. loans and divided those loans up so that participants could
5 participate in the interest and principal return from those loans. The loans
6 themselves were solely the responsibility of Mortgages Ltd. and were classic
7 commercial loans. See for example the testimony of attorney Robert Kant, pp.
8 1278-1279 to the effect that the promissory notes referencing a loan or
9 commercial transaction are not generally considered securities and flat statement
10 of attorney Robert Bornhoft that the loans were commercial loans. (*Bornhoft at*
11 *pp.652-653*). All Radical Bunny did was divide those loans. Radical Bunny was
12 a servicer and a conduit. (*Hirsch at pp. 1583-1584*).

13 There is no claim by the Division that the loans from Radical Bunny to
14 Mortgages Ltd. were securities. They were commercial notes, (*Bornhoft at pp.652-*
15 *653*) and (*Robert Kant at pp.1278-1279*) Mortgages Ltd. used the money to make
16 commercial loans to developers. (*Bornhoft at pp 652-653, Grainger at p.1955-*
17 *1956, Hirsch at p. 1701*). Apparently the Division thinks something changed the
18 character of those loans because of what Radical Bunny did.

19 Radical Bunny divided those loans, but did not advertise or solicit for
20 participants. More importantly, the Corporation Commission has never before tried
21 to regulate the transfer and division of commercial notes. Such transfers routinely
22 occur and long standing factors such as Maury Resnick, Tony Nicoli, Chuck Coles,
23 retired judges, small furniture stores and car dealers have routinely been able to
24 deal with commercial notes or fractionate them without interference by the
25 Corporation Commission.

26 A finding of liability in this case would obligate the commission to expand
27 its regulation to all of the fractionalizations of all commercial notes. It would
28 subject the Commission and its Commissioners to liability when it failed to fund or

1 police the vast new area of commerce that the Division would have it claim. And
2 there is no grant of authority for such an expansion. It would ignore well settled
3 principals of State and Federal Securities Law to the effect that commercial paper
4 and its distribution in fractions is beyond the scope of securities laws. *See AMFAC*
5 *Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall*, 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978) which applied
6 Arizona State securities law. The participations were in commercial notes issued
7 by Mortgages Ltd., not Radical Bunny. Nothing allows this Commission to
8 regulate them.

9 **B. No Fraud Occurred**

10 As developed below everyone was told there are “no guarantees” and that all
11 investment involves risk. Words such as “safe” or “secured” do not create liability.
12 Here it is undisputed that the participants were ultimately treated as secured and
13 “safe” is only an opinion. Moreover “forward looking” statements which address
14 the future cannot be the basis of a claim of fraud when the participants both were
15 told and understood there could be “no guarantees.”

16 **II. Facts**

17 **A. History**

18
19 In 1995, some of the people who ultimately became members of Radical
20 Bunny began to invest in mortgages serviced by Mortgages Ltd. At that point, the
21 participants invested directly in the mortgages and received a percentage interest
22 in certain mortgages that Mortgages Ltd. serviced. (*Hirsch at pp.1510-1512*)
23 Thus, in the beginning, and thereafter, Mortgages Ltd. found borrowers that
24 created mortgages and sold to the participants “pass through” fractional loans and
25 lien interest in real estate collateral. (*Hirsch at pp.1510-1512*) The Mortgages
26 Ltd. loans were commercial loans first position deeds for the financing of
27 construction with limits on loan to value ratios. (*Raval at pp.2012-2014, Bornhoft*
28 *at pp.652-653*).

1 Both Horizon Partners and Radical Bunny were formed for the purpose of
2 pooling funds to invest in Mortgages Ltd.'s pass through program. (*Hirsch at*
3 *1510-12, 1522-1523*). (*Exhibit S-56 at pp. 9-10, Hirsch Declaration at p. 2*).
4 Horizon Partners and Radical Bunny did not advertise. They did not solicit.
5 People satisfied with their investment returns described the program to their
6 acquaintances and if those acquaintances choose to inquire, in some instances they
7 became additional participants. There were no sales materials. There were no
8 commissions paid; no referral fees, no presentations to the public. There was no
9 website. There was no soliciting, no yellow page advertisement. (*Hirsch at*
10 *pp.1609-1611*). There was not even a sign on the door where Radical Bunny was
11 headquartered (*Hirsch at pp.1698-1699*). Participants put their money in a Radical
12 Bunny Trust account. (*Hirsch at p.1676*). They were participating in fractional
13 interest in loans to Mortgages Ltd. They were not investors in Radical Bunny and
14 did not become owners or equity holders in Radical Bunny. Radical Bunny was
15 just a servicer. (*Hirsch at pp.1671-1672, 1695*).

16 No money was diverted, unaccounted for, misappropriated or missing; there
17 was no Ponzi Scheme here. (*Berta Walder at pp.1458-1459*). The participants
18 were provided information that came from Mortgages Ltd. and later on
19 approximately on a semi-annual basis, there was a meeting held in which matters
20 were discussed related to the various programs. *Hirsch at pp. 1558, Howard*
21 *Walder at pp. 1035-45, Exhibit S-24*.

22 In approximately 2000, Horizon Partners received a "spread" of one quarter
23 of one percent. Horizon Partners made all distributions of interest and the
24 principal to participants, maintained accounts for participants, provided regular
25 account statements reviewed the loan summary sheets presented by Mortgages Ltd.
26 Horizon Partners also provided tax forms at the conclusion of each tax year.
27 (*Hoffman at pp. 762-764*).

28

1 Radical Bunny was formed in June of 1999. Mortgages Ltd. wanted
2 \$100,000 minimum investments. The new Radical Bunny program from 2005 on
3 required \$50,000 then \$25,000 from each participant which were then pooled when
4 Radical Bunny loaned to Mortgages Ltd. or earlier when Horizon transferred a
5 particular Mortgages Ltd. loan to a group of participants. (*Berta Walder at p.*
6 *1355*). See Notice and answer each at ¶42. Radical Bunny was formed to
7 overcome these hurdles for participants. From June 24, 1999 forward, Radical
8 Bunny and Horizon both were paid an extra one quarter or one half percent of all
9 payments to cover the overhead of pooling funds and the preparation of necessary
10 tax and other documents. (*Berta Walder at p. 1355, Exhibit S-33, 37(a) and*
11 *37(b)*).

12 After September 2005, Horizon did no more business and notified the
13 participants that the new servicer would be Radical Bunny. In 2005, Mortgages
14 Ltd. wanted to institute a new opportunity program, by which million dollar notes
15 would be issued by Mortgages Ltd. who would be obligated to pay the money and
16 would lend the money to its borrowers. (*Shah at p. 1122, Exhibit S-12(i)*). In
17 approximately 2005, Radical Bunny began to receive on new loans only a 2%
18 spread. (*Berta Walder at p. 1355*). The participants requested Radical Bunny to
19 act as their agent to purchase interests in specific Mortgages Ltd. loans. See
20 Exhibit S-12(i). The 2% spread was repeatedly and fully disclosed to all
21 participants and was the subject of an extensive presentation at the participants'
22 semi-annual meeting held in 2006. Thereafter, it was discussed at every semi-
23 annual meeting. (*Howard Walder at pp. 1035-1045, Exhibit S-12(i)*). The
24 invitation to semi-annual meetings specifically stated that the purpose was not to
25 solicit any new investors. (*ACC exhibit S-23(a)*).

26 Later, the loans were made with Mortgages Ltd. itself as the borrower. In all
27 instances, the loans were made and the notes were given to finance construction.
28 The proceeds could not be used for overhead. (*Hirsch at pp. 1701-1703*).

1 **C. The Loans And The Participants Were, In Fact, Secured**

2 The loans made to Mortgages Ltd. were secured. Mortgages Ltd. assured
3 Radical Bunny and its participants that they were secured. Mr. Coles represented
4 Radical Bunny was secured by all of the assets of Mortgages Ltd.

5 The Bankruptcy Court's plan treated Radical Bunny as a secured creditor
6 and gave it all the relief asserted in the claim for secured status. *See Exhibit R-4,*
7 *R-5 (Plan of Reorganization at p.21 and Order).*

8 Mr. Olsen, the chief financial officer of Mortgages Ltd. told a group of
9 individual participants that Radical Bunny held as security of all the assets of
10 Mortgages Ltd. (*Patel at pp.1932-1935, 2011-2014, Hirsch at pp.1628-1630*).
11 Scott Coles also said Radical Bunny was secured and Mortgages Ltd. prepared the
12 security documents including UCC-1 filings, notes, and a list of assets used for
13 security interim financials and a balance sheet. (*Hirsch at p.1746*).

14 The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued by the Bankruptcy
15 judge in the Mortgages Ltd bankruptcy *Exhibit R4-R5* found that Radical bunny
16 was the largest creditor and the only major secured creditor of Mortgages Ltd. at
17 the inception of the Mortgages Ltd Bankruptcy, (*Plan of Reorganization at pp.21-*
18 *25 and Order*) and further recognized that it had a first priority security interest in
19 Mortgages Ltd.'s interest in more than \$94 million in one project alone. (*Plan of*
20 *Reorganization at p.25*) Mortgages Ltd. prepared the documents and always
21 represented the loans from Radical bunny to Mortgages Ltd. were secured. The
22 audited statements of Mortgages Ltd. said all of the assets of Mortgages Ltd. were
23 pledged to secure the Radical Bunny loans. Any defects in the paperwork did not
24 bar the existence of secured status. Recently the bankruptcy court found the proof
25 of claim alone constituted a prima facie case that Radical Bunny was secured.
26 (*Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and amended Order Granting Radical*
27 *Bunny's Administrative Claim at pp.3 and 20*) They were backed by promissory
28 notes, financing statements, a personal guaranty of the only stockholder of

1 Mortgages Ltd., Scott Coles, and the constant assurances of Mortgages Ltd.
2 officers that Radical Bunny had a secured interest in all of the assets of Mortgages
3 Ltd. (*Hirsch at pp.1628-1630, 1691-1694, 1746, Bankruptcy findings at pp.3 ¶7*).
4 All of the defendants believed the loans were secured (*Berta Walder at pp.1339,*
5 *1396, 1406-1408, Hirsch at pp.1544, 1556, 1567-1568, 1589*) and when the issue
6 was finally determined in a court of law, their belief was confirmed. (*Plan of*
7 *Reorganization at p.21*).

8 Jordan Kroop, a bankruptcy lawyer in both the Radical Bunny and
9 Mortgages Ltd. bankruptcy cases recognized the law allows for equitable security.
10 (*Kroop at pp.2096, 2103*). He also recognized that at the end of the Mortgages
11 Ltd. bankruptcy Radical Bunny received, without concession, a determination it
12 was secured, which was everything it could have won. (*Kroop at pp.2102-2103*).

13 Mr. Bornhoft, the lawyer who wrote a letter saying Radical Bunny was
14 unsecured, had no opinion about whether they had equitable lien rights or that
15 their claim of security could not be enforced. (*Bornhoft at pp.546, 640-641*).

16 **D. Respondents Did Not Determine Whether Mortgages Ltd. Made**
17 **Money**

18 As agents and members of Radical Bunny, Defendants reviewed the
19 Mortgages Ltd. loans that were to be funded, Defendants received internal
20 financial statements prepared by Mortgages Ltd., had meetings with company
21 management, received audited third party financial statements, reviewed lending
22 criteria, inspected loan documents, met with Mortgages Ltd. borrowers, spoke to
23 Mortgages Ltd. officers and reviewed documents with those officers. They also
24 made site visits. (*Berta Walder at pp.1336-1337, Hirsch at pp.1570-1571*). But
25 there is no evidence they controlled Mortgages Ltd.'s accounting or profitability.

26 **E. Participants Acquired A Percentage Interest In Particular Loans**

27 The participants, after they submitted their money, executed a direction to
28 purchase. A typical direction to purchase was a confirmation of funds already

1 submitted, not a solicitation to become a participant in the program. The direction
2 to purchase authorized a purchaser's agent (Radical Bunny) to acquire an interest
3 in a specific Mortgages Ltd. loan. The direction to purchase set forth the amount
4 submitted, the percentage interest in the Mortgages Ltd. loan that the participant
5 would have, the annual (net interest rate) to be paid to the participant, the maturity
6 date of the loan and interest payment due date. The direction to purchase included.
7 "Your investment is collateralized by the beneficial interest under various deeds of
8 trusts held by Mortgages Ltd." See Exhibit 12(l). Mortgages Ltd prepared all loan
9 documents and UCC-1's which is recorded. (*Hirsch at pp.1643-1648*). None of
10 the Defendants in this matter took a profit out of Radical Bunny. (*Hirsch at*
11 *p.1580*). All money went into a trust account. Any repayment to any of the
12 participants if they so instructed was virtually immediate, otherwise upon a
13 participants instruction, it was reinvested in another Mortgages Ltd. loan program.
14 (*Howard Walder at pp.1975-1978, Hirsch at pp.1694-1695*).

15 **F. Respondents Did Not Gain**

16 Mr. Hirsch sold a residence, an accounting practice, took a home equity
17 advance on two of his homes and sold other property to put money into
18 investments with Mortgages Ltd. as a participant of Radical Bunny. (*Hirsch at p.*
19 *1580*). During the time before Mr. Coles died Mr. Hirsch was shown as receiving
20 about \$1.23 million on the books but at the same time he spent \$2.5 to \$3 million
21 in participations. (*Hirsch at pp.1580, 1606, 1804-1805*). Harish Shah took money
22 out of his home equity line of credit, and his employee pension all of which went
23 to Mortgages Ltd. as a participant of Radical Bunny. (*Hirsch Declaration at p.4*).
24 Howard and Berta Walder rolled over individual retirement accounts, sold a house
25 and took an advance on their home equity all to become participants. (*Hirsch*
26 *Declaration at p.4*). The total amount of monies put into Mortgages Ltd. programs
27 by these participants as Radical Bunny participants and not returned was over
28 \$7,000,000. (*Hirsch Declaration at p.4*). The participants took no money from

1 Horizon Investments or Radical Bunny in excess of what they put in. (*Hirsch at*
2 *p.1580*).

3 **G. The Unwritten "Securities" Opinion**

4 In the fourth quarter in 2006, a concern was raised by Todd Brown of
5 Mortgages Ltd. as to whether Radical Bunny was required to take some action
6 under the Securities law. Radical Bunny interviewed a variety of lawyers. Radical
7 Bunny eventually hired Quarles & Brady. The entire representation proceeded
8 along the basis of what action was necessary to "fix" any problems Radical Bunny
9 may have had. No lawyer ever told any of the Defendants to stop taking
10 participants' money or, that they were violating securities laws or that they were
11 operating illegally. (*Hirsch at pp.1584, 1592, Berta Walder at pp.1429-1430,*
12 *1462-1463*).

13 The participants only received interest and principal. They did not
14 participate in the profit of either Mortgages Ltd. or Radical Bunny and were not
15 responsible for any expenses or cash calls from those entities. (*Hirsch at p.1676,*
16 *Berta Walder at pp. 1458-1459*). The participants never invested in Radical
17 Bunny. The obligation to participants was from Mortgages Ltd. directly to the
18 participants in the matters stated. (*Hirsch at pp.1701-1703*).

19 Those facts stymied Quarles & Brady's determination of whether the
20 participations were "securities" for over two months. That fact alone casts serious
21 doubt on any conclusions reached by others after a brief description of the
22 program.

23 More importantly, there is not one scrap of paper beyond purported "notes"
24 to support Quarles & Brady's belated claim that it concluded the participations
25 were securities and told Radical Bunny to stop selling them. Mr. Shullaw who was
26 the associate researching that matter did not write an opinion to that effect, Mr.
27 Hoffman wrote no letter to Radical Bunny reaching a "securities" conclusion and
28 Mr. Bornhoft, after the firm supposedly told Radical Bunny to stop doing business,

1 wrote a document recognizing they were still in business. Mr. Hoffman had to
2 admit the advice, if it occurred, was "momentous" but apparently not so
3 "momentous" that the firm ever put it in writing to Radical Bunny. (*Hoffman at*
4 *pp.862, 877-880*). But even if it had, the decision is now for the Commission or
5 ultimately the Courts. Whatever Quarles & Brady's present litigation motivation,
6 their undocumented opinion does not decide this case. It must be decided on the
7 law which clearly exempts commercial notes from the definition of security.

8 **H. No Solicitation Occurred**

9 No commission or referral fees were paid and no solicitations were ever
10 made. There was no marketing of these participations, no sales materials were
11 ever prepared and no sales calls were ever made. They did not have a website or a
12 "presentation" for the purpose of raising money. They only returned calls. (*Hirsch*
13 *at pp.1609-1610*). Even the Division's proposed finding of fact on this issue
14 recognizes the clear evidence that there was no solicitation. It says,

15
16 "From January 1998 until after June 2008,
17 investors learned of Horizon Partners and
18 Radical Bunny Investment opportunities
19 from their accountant, Hirsch and Shah, or
20 by "words of mouth" from existing investors
21 or their friends and/or family. Investors
22 were friends, relatives, friends of relatives,
23 friends of friends and friends of clients."

24 Divisions Post Hearing Memorandum at p. 9 ¶58 citing *Mathis at p. 347*,
25 *Howard Walder at pp. 1055-1058* and *Grainger at pp. 1947-1948*.

26 There was not even a sign on the door. No phone calls, no commission
27 agreements, no salesmen, no flyers. (*Howard Walder at pp. 1055-1057*). No
28 inducement other than the interest to be paid by Mortgages Ltd. was discussed.
(*Sell at pp. 347-348, Howard Walder at pp. 1055-1057*).

1 The return did not depend on the efforts of Radical Bunny. Once the money
2 was loaned the fixed return came from Mortgages Ltd. and participants depended
3 only on these payments Mortgages Ltd. The participations were not described or
4 thought of as securities. They were in all cases percentage interests in loans made
5 to finance construction. (*Hirsch at pp.1592, 1701-1703*). Respondents swore Mr.
6 Kant never said the way Radical Bunny was operating was illegal or that people
7 could go to jail. (*Hirsch at p.1899*).

8 Mr. Bornhoft in June 2007, after all business was supposed to be halted,
9 prepared a document that said Radical Bunny “continues to make loans to the
10 debtor”. (*Mr. Bornhoft at pp.660-661*). Radical Bunny Proof of Claim in
11 bankruptcy, *see* Exhibit S-37(a). Defendants denied they were told to stop doing
12 business and report past violations. (*Hirsch at pp.1792-1794, Berta Walder at*
13 *pp.1429-1430*). While they did go forward with plans for a Private Offering
14 Memorandum, it was to erase any doubt about the status of the participations.
15 Private Offering Memorandum was equated with Peace of Mind. (*Hirsch at*
16 *99.1793-1794*).

17 Mr. Hirsch denies Mr. Kant said Radical Bunny was involved in illegal
18 activities. (*Hirsch at p.1899*). Quarles & Brady only said they did not know for
19 sure what Radical Bunny was. (*Berta Walder at pp.1385-1386, 1388-1390*). No
20 one said a word about securities regulation in the meeting with Mr. Sell. The
21 program at issue did not exist when Defendants talked to Mr. Sell. (*Hirsch at*
22 *pp.1580-1581, 1764-1765, 1784*).

23 Mr. Raval, Mr. Patel and Mr. Grainger all said risks were discussed and
24 were the subject of memos by some of those witnesses. (*Patel at p.1936, Raval at*
25 *pp.1997-1998, Grainger at p.1949-1950*). Mr. Patel learned of the existence of
26 Radical Bunny by asking Mr. Shah’s wife about investments. He was not solicited
27 by Mr. Shah. (*Mr. Patel at pp.1925-1926, 1943*). See, also Patel testimony he said
28 Defendants did not get him involved. (*Patel at p.1943*). The members of Radical

1 Bunny did not say there was no risk to the investment. Berta Walder used the
2 example of a dirty bomb to show that every investment had risks, pp.1493-1497.
3 Radical Bunny acted as a servicer and conduit. (*Hirsch at pp.1556-1557, 1671-*
4 *1674, 1818*).

5 **C. There Was No Fraud.**

6 The only hard evidence of the oral information provided new, unsolicited
7 participants was a surreptitiously taped recorded statement of Steven Freidberg's
8 conversation with Bunny Walder. The representations are a model of clarity,
9 "none of this is guaranteed...we have a history...you have two CPA's that are
10 licensed, still actively involved in taxes and working, but there is no guarantees. I
11 mean there can't be. Otherwise it wouldn't be an investment..." See Exhibit S-14
12 at 44:27.

13 Ms. Walder also accurately said that so long as Radical Bunny did not
14 actively solicit for investors then Radical Bunny would not be subject to Securities
15 Laws. (*Steven Freidberg at pp. 1657-1658*) That the investment was represented
16 as "safe" or "secured" was the only common contention of virtually all of the
17 participants who testified for the Commission. Some disappointed participants
18 now say they sought a completely guaranteed investment. Instead they got the
19 truth. The only representation established was that Mortgages Ltd. had always
20 paid on time, that the history indicated that it was a reliable investment (*Richard*
21 *Freidberg at p. 69*) that Scott Coles "never lost a dollar of investors' money."
22 (*Mathis at pp.316, l. 21-317, l. 6*). Radical Bunny never lost a single penny.
23 Mortgages Ltd. never lost a single penny. See Exhibit S-14 at 15:00. Ms. Hinman
24 testified that she invested because she was looking for "safe investment." Barbara
25 Mathis was the same. She was told that Mr. Hirsch and Ms. Walder thought the
26 investment safe because it was unlikely that all of Mortgages Ltd.'s loans would
27 go bad at the same time. (*Mathis pp. 272, l. 15 to 273, l. 5*). All those factual
28 statements are true.

1 No one was told there was no risk. Some of the investors admitted that they
2 knew there is always a risk. (*Richard Freidberg at p. 107*). The surreptitious tape
3 clearly proved Respondents never said the participations were guaranteed.
4 Ultimately every participant did turn out to be secured and at the end of the
5 Bankruptcy litigation Radical Bunny received a determination it was secured
6 which was everything it could have won in further litigation about its secured
7 status. (*Kroop at pp. 2102-2103*).

8 The Commission, without ever coming right out and saying it, seems to be
9 relying on the fact that certain lawyers testified that without being hired or without
10 any study, they made snap judgments that some sort of registration was required.

11 III. The Law

12 A. The Law Exempts These Notes From Securities Regulators.

13 The Securities statutes, both the Federal statutes and the State statutes, all
14 define a security to include “any...note.” But that is just the beginning of the
15 inquiry. “The Supreme Court has often admonished that a “thing may be within
16 the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute.” *United Housing*
17 *Foundation, Inc. v. Forman*, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975).” *Ruefenacht v.*
18 *O'Halloran*, 737 F.2d 320 (3d. Cir. 1984). This lawsuit is based on claims of fraud
19 in the purchase or sale of securities. If there is no security the Commission has no
20 claim or jurisdiction. *America Bus. Line, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Comm.*, 129 Ariz.
21 595, 633 P.2d 404 (1981); *Mohave Disposal Inc. v. City of Kingman*, 184 Ariz.
22 368, 909 Ariz. 435 (App. 1995).

23 In fact, while Article 15 § 4 of the Arizona Constitution gives it the power
24 to “investigate” and inspect and thus has the power of a Court to “enforce
25 attendance” and “the production of evidence, *see also* A.R.S. § 44-1823 to the
26 same effect A.R.S. § 44-1822 limits even that power to people “issuing or dealing
27 in or selling or buying securities.” By participating in a review of merits,
28 Respondents do not waive their claims that the Commission has no jurisdiction to

1 impose the relief the Division seeks or to address the subject of commercial notes
2 which are subsequently divided into fractions and transferred. Nothing gives it the
3 power to recover money in the amount of participants' losses or to levy fines
4 related to the creation of the notes or the participations in those notes. Whatever
5 authority it might have had disappeared when the sections dealing with the power
6 of the Corporation Commission were removed in the 1994 revisions of the
7 corporate code.

8 The Division can only impose civil penalties of \$5,000 per violation, A.R.S.
9 § 44-2037, or administrative penalties of \$5,000 per violation. A.R.S. § 44-2306.
10 No part of the evidence has specified the number of violations and the Division
11 did not approach the case as though it required proof of the number of violations.
12 The Commission cannot just determine the participants total losses and award that
13 amount. No statute or constitutional provision gives it that authority. And unless
14 a security is involved it can do nothing.

15 The name given to the instrument does not determine if it is a security. For
16 instance, in *United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman*, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the
17 court considered "stock" in a cooperative. The court said "common sense
18 suggests that people who intend to buy residential apartments in a state subsidized
19 cooperative, for personal use are not likely to believe that in reality they are
20 purchasing investment securities simply because the transaction is evidenced by
21 something called share of stock." See 421 U.S. 849. The Supreme Court held that
22 while the cooperative shares were called stock and "stock" was specifically listed
23 in the definition of securities, cooperative shares do not equate to something
24 ordinarily called stock.

25 What Radical Bunny conveyed was participations in notes not issued by
26 Radical Bunny. These notes were for a fixed return of a non-contingent
27 obligation.
28

1 The notes issued by Mortgages, Ltd. were not premised on profit. They
2 were for a fixed percentage. Those same notes, in fractional interests were
3 conveyed to the Radical Bunny participants. No one in any of the related
4 proceedings in this case has contended that these notes, as issued by Mortgages,
5 Ltd. were anything but common variety commercial notes, fitting within the
6 common understanding that commercial notes are not securities. That is because
7 there is not “risk capital” involved. “The investment—commercial test is
8 premised on the view securities laws evinced the concern of congress about
9 practices associated with investment transactions, and that securities laws were
10 not designed to regulate commercial transactions.” *AMFAC Mortgage Co. v.*
11 *Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc.*, 583 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1978). A holder of a
12 fractional interest in these notes is entitled to payment regardless of the success of
13 the venture and is not entitled to share in the profits. The test is whether the
14 participants “contributed risk capital” subject to the “entrepreneurial or
15 managerial efforts” of others. *United California Bank v. THC Financial Corp.*,
16 557 F.2d 1351, 1358 (9th Cir. 1977), *Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz*, 532
17 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).

18 The seminal case of *SEC v. J.W. Howey Co.*, 328 U.S. 293 (1946), requires
19 that an investment contract be “an investment of money in a common enterprise
20 with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.” *See*, 328 U.S. at 301.
21 Using that reasoning, the Court also held that employee’s interest in a compulsory
22 pension plan even though it had investments, which had a return and was clearly
23 designed to return money, was not a “security” within the meanings of the act.
24 *International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel*, 439 U.S. 551 (1979).

25 The Court noted that the employee did not invest in the pension fund, he
26 only accepted employment. Here, the participant did not invest in Radical Bunny.
27 Radical Bunny was the agent that acquired Mortgage Ltd. notes for its principals.
28

1 Before the law was changed to exempt certificates of deposits, *Marine Bank*
2 *v. Weaver*, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), also held that such deposits were not securities.
3 The 1934 Act specifically included the term “certificate of deposit,” but the court
4 noted that the securities laws were not intended to provide a broad remedy for all
5 fraud.

6 The characteristics usually associated with securities are the right to receive
7 dividends contingent upon a portion of the profits, negotiability, the ability to be
8 pledged or hypothecated, the conferring of voting rights in proportion to the
9 number of shares owned and finally the capacity to depreciate in value. *See*
10 *Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth*, 471 U.S. 631 (1985). In that case, the court
11 reserved until another day the question of whether notes or bonds might be shown
12 by proving only the document itself. Five years later in *Reeves v. Ernst & Young*,
13 494 U.S. 56 (1990), the court said “that whether a note is a security depends on
14 the nature of the note.” Here the notes were used to finance construction. No
15 lawyer involved thought of the base notes to Mortgages Ltd. as securities. So we
16 pass to whether Radical Bunny did anything to make commercial notes into
17 securities within either of the Federal Securities Acts.

18 As shown above, notes may not be notes for securities purposes. The cases
19 are many. *See Kansas State Bank v. Citizens Bank*, 737 F.2d 1490 (8th Cir. 1984),
20 (participation in notes not subject to anti fraud provisions because it was
21 collateralized, was at a fixed interest rate and the borrower intended to use the
22 funds as operating funds). *Chemical Bank v. Arthur Anderson & Co.*, 726 F.2d
23 930 (2nd Cir. 1984) (notes to finance a borrowers current operations were not
24 securities even though their maturity may have exceeded nine months).

25 That analysis brings us to *AMFAC Mortgage Corporation v. Arizona Mall*
26 *of Tempe, Inc.*, 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978). There the instruments were notes
27 and suit was brought both under the Federal Securities Statutes and the Arizona
28 Statute. The court held a motion to dismiss appropriate. After noting that “It has

1 been left to Federal courts to determine what financial transactions actually
2 involve 'securities'." *Id.*, 583 F.2d at 431, and after noting a split in the circuits as
3 to the tests used, the court reached this conclusion: "A note given to a lender in
4 the course of a commercial financing transaction is not a security within the
5 meaning of Federal Securities laws." *Id.*, 583 F.2d at 434. It finally concluded,
6 "If we were to expand the reach of these acts to ordinary commercial loan
7 transactions the purpose behind these laws would be distorted." *Id.*, 583 F.2d at
8 434. *See also*, *United American Bank v. Gunter*, 620 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1981),
9 *Dubach v. Weitzel*, 135 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 1998) and *LaBrun v. Kuswa*, 24 Supp.
10 2d 641 (E.D. La. 1998) holding commercial paper exempt even where the funds
11 went into operating capital, not the case here.

12 *AMFAC* holds that the fact a loan is secured and the fact that personal
13 guarantees were received makes the holder less dependent on "entrepreneurial
14 efforts." A 24 month due date also was held to lessen risk. In our case, the notes
15 were due in 12 months.

16 These notes were given to a lender in the course of commercial financing
17 transactions. Under the *AMFAC* decision reviewing both State and Federal law,
18 they were held not to be securities for the purposes of the fraud provisions of State
19 and Federal law.

20 The Ninth Circuit said the following factors must be considered to
21 determine whether an obligation is a security: (1) time, (2) collateralization, (3)
22 form of the obligation, (4) circumstances of issuance, (5) relationship between the
23 amount borrowed and the size of the borrower's business, and (6) the
24 contemplated use of the funds. *AMFAC* at 431. In *AMFAC* as well as here, the
25 notes were fractionalized and distributed. In *AMFAC* 90% was divided and
26 distributed to various real estate investment trusts. Here the interests in the notes
27 were divided and distributed without solicitation. That does not create a security.
28 *See*, e.g. *De Luz Ranchos Inv., Ltd. v. Coldwell Banker & Co.*, 608 F.2d 1297 (9th

1 Cir.1979) (an agent who merely transferred title to land contracts is not involved
2 with securities or investment contracts).

3 In Arizona for criminal purposes, a note is a note and fraud in connection
4 with it will support a criminal charge. *State v. Tober*, 173 Ariz. 211, 841 P.2d 206
5 (1992). In criminal cases the court does not look at either the “risk capital” test of
6 AMFAC, *supra*, or the “family resemblance test” of *Reves v. Ernest F. Young*,
7 *supra*.

8 But under either test for regulation or civil fraud provisions, commercial
9 paper and commercial notes are exempt. AMFAC, *supra*, *United American Bank*,
10 *supra* and *LaBrun v. Kusevia*, *supra*. It does not matter which “test” is applied,
11 commercial paper is a long existing, time honored inception to both State and
12 Federal Securities laws. AMFAC did not just apply the Federal law test much
13 discussed. It reviewed the Arizona securities laws and found that the Arizona
14 Statutes did not apply to fractionated commercial notes. Nothing has overruled
15 that decision and the Commission has taken no action up to now to regulate the
16 historical trade in commercial paper, its discounting, its fractionalization, or the
17 retention of a portion of the interest paid by parties in the sometimes lengthy
18 stream of ownership. It is unfortunate that participants may have sustained losses
19 (the final results in the Bankruptcies are not in) but the Commission is not
20 authorized to address every financial loss or to venture into the vast field of
21 commercial paper.

22 The only thing that happened to these commercial notes was that they were
23 fractionalized and distributed without marketing or solicitation. Here the notes
24 were not marketed at all. There were no sales materials, no sales program, no
25 solicitations, there was only word of mouth from other investors. There is no
26 government interest in regulating non-marketed fractional commercial notes and
27 as *Bromberg, supra* notes; “One of the most important elements in determining
28 whether or not a particular instrument is a security...is the manner in which it is

1 marketed. *Bromberg, supra* at 4-94.6. *International Brotherhood of Teamsters,*
2 *Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America v. Daniel*, 439 U.S. 551
3 (1979) and *Marine Bank v. Weaver*, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) had no marketing and in
4 both cases the court found no security.

5 *AMFAC, supra* says that when the notes left Mortgages Ltd. they were not
6 securities. Nothing happened after that—no marketing, no management of
7 Mortgages Ltd. by Defendants, no change from an interest only instrument—to
8 change the status of these notes from commercial notes. Just dividing them up
9 does not make each fractional interest a security beyond all questions of fact. *See,*
10 *AMFAC, supra.*

11 **B. Radical Bunny Held An Enforceable Security Interest.**

12 Equitable liens and equitable mortgages have been recognized in Arizona
13 since at least 1908. *See Richardson v. Wren*, 11 Ariz. 395, 95 Pac. 124 (1908).
14 The basic law is simple. “[W]here it is clearly shown that the intention of the
15 parties to a transaction is to give a security for a debt or obligation upon some
16 particular property, however informally such intention may be expressed, equity
17 will...declare an equity mortgage or lien to exist...*Stephen v. Patterson*, 21 Ariz.
18 308, 311, 188 Pac. 131 (1920). The fact that none of the statutes are followed
19 does not invalidate the lien. *Hueg v. Sunburst Farms (Glendale) Mut. Water and*
20 *Agric. Co.*, 122 Ariz. 284, 594 P.2d 538 (App. 1979); and *see Kalmanoff v. Weitz*,
21 8 Ariz. App. 171, 444 P.2d 728 (1968).

22 While Scott Coles was alive, everyone at Mortgages Ltd. said Radical
23 Bunny was secured by all the assets of Mortgages Ltd. Mortgages Ltd. prepared
24 the documents evidencing that promise and repeatedly affirmed it. Any good
25 lawyer would want to correct the absence of a formal security agreement, but that
26 does not mean that as a matter of law no security exists. Even Mr. Bornhoft, the
27 lawyer who wrote a letter to Mr. Kant saying Radical Bunny was unsecured,
28

1 admitted he had no opinion about whether it had equitable lien rights. (*Bornhoft*
2 *at pp. 546, 640-641*).

3 If it did, then the only universal statement cited by the Division as a basis
4 for its case is not an incorrect statement. "Your investment is collateralized by the
5 beneficial interest under various deeds of trust held by Mortgages Ltd." was true.
6 Mortgages Ltd. held deeds of trust and Radical Bunny was secured by everything
7 Mortgages Ltd. owned. Everyone agreed to that and the financing statements by
8 Mortgages Ltd. for recording said that. The subject of the lien was variously
9 described in the financing statements as "all assets owned by Mortgages Ltd.
10 from time to time" and "all mortgage interest under mortgages or beneficial
11 interests under deeds of trust held by Mortgages Ltd." Radical Bunny could have
12 foreclosed on its lien and owned those beneficial interests which it then also could
13 have caused to be foreclosed. That is why Radical Bunny's Bankruptcy lawyer,
14 Mr. Kroop, on cross examination acknowledged that the outcome of the
15 Bankruptcy was that Radical Bunny was treated as fully secured and that it
16 obtained all the relief it ever could have obtained with perfect documents. (*Kroop*
17 *at pp. 2096, 2103*).

18 **C. No Fraud Occurred When Representatives Said That Radical Bunny**
19 **Was Secured.**

20 The issue of whether questions that then existed about the adequacy of the
21 documents can create an issue of misrepresentation for which Defendants can be
22 held accountable depends on the extent each had a duty to disclose. *See Basic Inc.*
23 *v. Levinson*, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n. 17, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1988)
24 ("Silence, absent a duty to disclose is not misleading under Rule 10b-5."). "When
25 an allegation of fraud [under § 10(b)] is based on non-disclosure, there can be no
26 fraud absent a duty to speak." *Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank*
27 *of Denver, N.A.*, 511 U.S. 164, 174, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed. 2d 119 (1994)
28 (quoting *Chiarella v. United States*, 445 U.S. 222, 232, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 63 L. Ed.

1 2d 348 (1980)). *In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig.*, 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir.
2 1994). “And while “literally true,” statements can give rise to liability under
3 certain circumstances, “Rule 10b-5...prohibit[s] only misleading and untrue
4 statements, not statements that are incomplete.” These Defendants had no duty to
5 affirmatively disclose activities designed to change their equitable lien to a
6 statutory lien. The basis for the lien did not change the ultimate effect of the lien
7 Radical Bunny has been determined to hold.

8 This is not the same case as the one pending in Federal Court where these
9 Defendants are accused of aiding and abetting Mortgages Ltd.’s fraudulent
10 conduct. Respondents deny anything like that occurred, but that is not the claim
11 made by the Division. Rulings on motions to dismiss in the Federal cases are only
12 based on what some plaintiff claims, not a determination of what happened.
13 Finally, denials of motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment are not
14 final and cannot be used to decide cases in other litigation. *See Circle K Corp. v.*
15 *Industrial Comm.*, 179 Ariz, 422, 980 P.2d 642 (App. 1993), *J.W. Hancock Ent. V.*
16 *Arizona Reg. of Contrs.*, 142 Ariz. 400, 690 P.2d 119 (App. 1984), *Armstrong v.*
17 *Aramco Services Co.*, 155 Ariz. 345, 746 P.2d 917 (App. 1987).

18 In this respect, *In Re Donald J. Trump Casinos Securities Litigation*, 7 F.3d
19 357, 370-71 (3rd Cir. 1993) is instructive. There, the Third Circuit Court of
20 Appeals recognized that when “forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied
21 by meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking statements will not form
22 the basis for a securities fraud claim if those statements did not affect the ‘total
23 mix’ of information...In other words, cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the
24 alleged omissions or misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law.”
25 Respondents are entitled to protection under the “bespeaks caution” doctrine,
26 because the alleged false statements contained in the Official Statements were
27 “accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements.” *In re Worlds of Wonder*, 35

28

1 F.3d at 1413. The clear evidence is that even when pressed participants and those
2 who inquired were told “there are no guarantees.”

3 *See Teamsters Local 175, et.al. v. Clorox Co., et.al.*, 353 F.3d 1125, 1131-33
4 (9th Cir. 2004) (forward statements were accompanied by meaningful cautionary
5 language); *In re Copper Mountain Sec. Litig.*, 311 F. Supp.2d 857, 882 (N.D. Cal.
6 2004) (cautionary statements need not identify “all factors that might make the
7 results different from those forecasted.” This doctrine was also recognized in *In re*
8 *Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation*, 35 F.3d 1407, 1413 (9th Cir. 1994). *See*
9 *also In re Convergent Technologies, Inc.*, 948 F.2d 507, 516 (9th Cir. 1991). What
10 might happen if Mortgages Ltd. defaulted is a “what if” future event. Under
11 Arizona law, a claim for “negligent misrepresentation” or fraud cannot be
12 predicated on statements regarding future occurrences. *McAlister v. Citibank*, 171
13 Ariz. 207, 215, 829 P.2d 1253, 1261 (Ct. App. 1992) (dismissing negligent
14 misrepresentation claim because “allegations relating to McAlister’s negligent
15 misrepresentation claim all relate to future events.”). Given the cautionary
16 language routinely given, “there are no guarantees,” Berta Walder Exhibit S-14 at
17 44:27, claims of problems with the documents establishing Radical Bunny’s
18 secured position are not actionable, particularly where, as here, Radical Bunny was
19 ultimately determined to be secured.

20 **D. The Commission Should Make Its Own Judgment Without Reference**
21 **To What Some Self Interested Lawyer Said About The Application Of**
22 **The Securities Laws.**

23 Here the Division elicited testimony from self interested witnesses that they
24 thought the participations were subject to the Securities Statutes. Of course not
25 one of them wrote a letter or even sent a scrap of paper to Radical Bunny to that
26 effect at the time and the only lawyer hired to research it wrote a letter saying he
27 would look into it, then never provided a formal determination despite tens of
28 thousands of dollars of legal fees. Their testimony cannot be considered.

1 The five factor test to determine whether to allow witnesses to testify to
2 their conclusions mandated by *Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 509
3 U.S. 579 (1993) cannot apply to a legal opinion rather than a factual opinion for
4 good reason. “If the expert is called simply to give an opinion on the applicable
5 law, he should be excluded as introducing on the Judge’s role. USCA,
6 Commentary, Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 701-end at p.70, citing *CMF*
7 *Trading, Inc. v. Quantum Air, Inc.*, 98 F.3d 887 (6th Cir. 1996) where a witness
8 wanted to testify that the parties had created a joint venture.

9 Legal conclusions have no place in an expert testimony “[A]n expert
10 witness cannot give an opinion as to her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an
11 ultimate issue of law.” *Hangerter v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co.*, 373 F.3d
12 998, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004); *see Nationwide Transp. Fin. V. Cass Info. Sys.*, 523
13 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) where an expert on the Uniform Commercial Code was
14 not allowed to testify. The Arizona law, when a case is not being tried to a jury, is
15 the same. *Pool v. Superior Ct.*, 139 Ariz. 98, 677 P.2d 261 (1984), *Pincock v.*
16 *Dupnik*, 146 Ariz. 91, 703 P.2d 1240 (App. 1985), *Webb v. Omni Block, Inc.*, 216
17 Ariz. 349, 166 P.3d 140 (App. 2007). It is up to the Commission, at this level,
18 whether it wants to attempt the expansion of its jurisdiction into the transfer and
19 fractionalization of commercial loans.

20 **E. Howard Walder Has No Liability**

21 We would be remiss if we did not point out that Howard Walder only ran
22 the computer and accounting side of the Horizon and Radical Bunny operation.
23 He did that without a single reported error. It was not his function to even talk to
24 investors. He did not prepare the confirmation of purchase or the letters that went
25 out. He did not manage either of the LLC’s. He should be dismissed from this
26 proceeding.

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Conclusion


The participants' losses, if any, are beyond the powers of this Commission. Claims of fraud based on generalized non-factual words such as "safe" will not lie. Claims based on what might happen in the future will not lie. And claims that the investment was described as secured turned out to be true.

The participations were participations in ordinary commercial notes which have long been held to be not subject to the securities statutes.

This case should be dismissed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of April, 2011.

LAVELLE & LAVELLE, PLC

By: 


Michael J. LaVelle
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Attorneys for Respondents Tom Hirsch, Diane Rose Hirsch, Berta Walder, Howard Walder, Harish P. Shah, Madhavi H. Shah and Horizon Partners, LLC

ORIGINAL and 13 COPIES filed this 4th day of April, 2011 with:

ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION
Securities Division
1300 West Washington, Third Floor
Phoenix, Arizona 85007

COPY of the foregoing MAILED this 4th day of April, 2011 to:

1 Lyn Farmer
2 Chief Administrative Law Judge
3 **ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION**
4 1200 West Washington
5 Phoenix, Arizona 85007
6
7 COPY of the foregoing MAILED and EMAILED this
8 4th day of April, 2011 to:
9
10 Julie Coleman
11 **ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION**
12 Securities Division
13 1300 West Washington, Third Floor
14 Phoenix, Arizona 85007

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